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Abstract
We study inverse-Monge assignment games, namely cooperative assignment
games in which the assignment matrix satisfies the inverse Monge property.
For square inverse-Monge assignment games, we describe their cores and we
obtain a closed formula for the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core
allocations. We also apply the above results to solve the non-square case.
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1. Introduction
The Monge property of a matrix was named by Hoffman (1963) in
recognition of the work of the 18th-century French mathematician Gas-
pard Monge, who used the property to solve a soil-transport problem. The
property has been subsequently applied to a variety of areas - for specific
references, applications and properties see the surveys in Burkard (2007) or
Burkard et al. (1996).
Here, we show that by using Monge matrices, the analysis of cooperative
assignment games is simplified thanks to the Monge conditions and proper-
ties. Our main interest lies in describing the core and two specific allocations
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- the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations, when dealing
with inverse-Monge assignment games.
The optimal (linear sum) assignment problem is that of finding an opti-
mal matching, given a matrix that collects the potential profit of each pair
of agents of opposite sectors. Examples include the placement of workers
in jobs, students in colleges, or physicians in hospitals. Once an optimal
matching has been made, the question arises as how to share the output
between partners. This question was first considered in Shapley and Shubik
(1972). They associate each assignment problem with a cooperative game,
or game in coalitional form. In the assignment game, the worth of each
coalition of agents is taken as the maximum profit they can attain.
The main solution concept in cooperative games is the core. The core of
a game consists of allocations of the optimal profit (the worth of the grand
coalition) in such a way that no subcoalition can further improve upon it.
Thus, if the parties agree to share the profit of cooperation by means of
a core allocation, no coalition has any incentive to depart from the grand
coalition and act on its own. Shapley and Shubik prove that the core of
the assignment game is a nonempty polyhedral convex set and that this
coincides with the set of solutions of the dual linear program related to the
linear sum optimal assignment problem.
In this paper we study assignment games in which the matrix satisfies
the inverse Monge property, called inverse-Monge assignment games. This
property is equivalent to the supermodularity of the matrix, interpreted as
a function on the product of the set of indices with the usual order.
We show that for square inverse-Monge assignment games, the central
tridiagonal band of the matrix, that is the main diagonal, the upper diagonal
and the lower diagonal, is sufficient to determine the core. As a result, and
unlike the general case, not all inequalities are necessary to describe the
core explicitly, and in this case the buyer-seller exact representative of the
matrix (Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 2002b) can be computed by a closed formula.
Two extreme points in the core, the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal
core allocations, are computed with the aid of the previous representation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the assign-
ment game and the pertinent results. In Section 3, inverse-Monge assign-
ment games are defined and we describe the core of a square inverse-Monge
assignment game. In Section 4 we give an explicit formula to compute the
buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations. In Section 5, the
non-square case is considered. We conclude in Section 6 with some remarks.
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2. The assignment game
An assignment problem (M,M ′, A) is defined to be a nonempty finite
set M of agents, usually named buyers, a nonempty finite set M ′ of an-
other type of agents, usually named sellers, and a nonnegative matrix A =
(aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ . Entry aij represents the profit obtained by the mixed-pair
(i, j) ∈M ×M ′ if they trade. Let us assume there are |M | = m buyers and
|M ′| = m′ sellers. If m = m′, the assignment problem is said to be square.
Let us denote by M+m×m′ the set of nonnegative matrices with m rows and
m′ columns.
A matching µ ⊆M×M ′ between M and M ′ is a bijection from M0 ⊆M
to M ′0 ⊆M ′, such that |M0| = |M ′0| = min {|M | , |M ′|}. We write (i, j) ∈ µ
as well as j = µ (i) or i = µ−1 (j) . The set of all matchings is denoted by
M (M,M ′). A buyer i ∈ M is unmatched by µ if there is no j ∈ M ′ such
that (i, j) ∈ µ. Similarly, j ∈ M ′ is unmatched by µ if there is no i ∈ M
such that (i, j) ∈ µ.
A matching µ ∈ M (M,M ′) is optimal for the assignment problem
(M,M ′, A) if for all µ′ ∈ M (M,M ′) we have ∑(i,j)∈µ aij ≥ ∑(i,j)∈µ′ aij ,
and we denote the set of optimal matchings by M∗A (M,M ′).
Shapley and Shubik (1972) associate any assignment problem with a
game in coalitional form (assignment game) with player set N = M ∪M ′
and characteristic function wA defined by A in the following way: for S ⊆M
and T ⊆M ′,
wA (S ∪ T ) = max
µ∈M(S,T )
 ∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij
 , (1)
where M(S, T ) is the set of matchings from S to T and wA(S ∪ T ) = 0 if
M(S, T ) = ∅.
The core of the assignment game3,
C (wA) =
(x, y) ∈ RM+ × RM ′+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x(S) + y(T ) ≥ wA (S ∪ T ) ,
for all S ⊆M and T ⊆M ′, and
x(M) + y(M ′) = wA (M ∪M ′)
 ,
is always nonempty and, if µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) is an arbitrary optimal match-
ing, the core is the set of nonnegative payoff vectors (u, v) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ such
3For any vector z ∈ RN , with N = {1, . . . , n} and any coalition R ⊆ N we denote by
z(R) =
∑
i∈R zi. As usual, the sum over the empty set is zero.
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that
ui + vj ≥ aij for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′, (2)
ui + vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ, (3)
and the payoff to unmatched agents by µ is null. This coincides (see Shapley
and Shubik, 1972) with the set of solutions of the dual of the linear program
related to the linear sum assignment problem.
Among the core allocations of an assignment game, there are two specific
extreme core points: the buyers-optimal core allocation (uA, vA) where each
buyer attains her maximum core payoff and each seller his minimum, and
the sellers-optimal core allocation (uA, vA) where each seller attains his max-
imum core payoff and each buyer her minimum. From Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) we know that the maximum payoff of an agent is his/her marginal
contribution, and that this can be attained for all agents on the same side
at the same core allocation. For any assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA), we
have
uAi = wA(M ∪M ′)− wA(M ∪M ′ \ {i}) for all i ∈M, and
vAj = wA(M ∪M ′)− wA(M ∪M ′ \ {j}) for all j ∈M ′.
(4)
Notice that, if µ is an arbitrary optimal matching of (M,M ′, A), we
obtain from the description of the core that uAi = aiµ(i)− vAµ(i) for all i ∈M
assigned by µ and vAj = aµ−1(j)j − uAµ−1(j) for all j ∈ M ′ assigned by µ,
while agents unmatched by µ have a fixed null core payoff. Therefore, the
minimum core payoffs for a sector are determined by knowing an optimal
matching and the maximum core payoffs of the other sector.
Moreover, the minimum payoff that a mixed-pair (i, j) ∈M×M ′ obtains
in the core of a square assignment game (M∪M ′, wA) (see Nu´n˜ez and Rafels,
2002b, Theorem 2) is given by:
min
(x,y)∈C(wA)
{xi+yj} = aiµ(i)+aµ−1(j)j−wA(N)+wA(N \{µ(i), µ−1(j)}), (5)
where µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′) is an arbitrary optimal matching.
3. Inverse-Monge assignment games
In this section we introduce assignment games where the assignment
matrix satisfies the inverse Monge property, also known in the literature as
anti-Monge, contra-Monge, or supermodular.
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Definition 3.1. An assignment problem (M,M ′, A) is an inverse Monge
assignment problem if
aij + akl ≥ ail + akj for all 1 ≤ i < k ≤ m, and 1 ≤ j < l ≤ m′. (6)
This definition is equivalent to saying that any 2 × 2 subproblem has
an optimal matching in its main diagonal. The inverse Monge property
only has to be checked for consecutive 2 × 2 subproblems (adjacent rows
and columns). That is, a matrix A ∈ M+m×m′ satisfies the inverse Monge
property if and only if
aij+ai+1 j+1 ≥ ai j+1+ai+1 j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1, and 1 ≤ j ≤ m′−1, (7)
and then it can be easily tested.
The associated cooperative game (M ∪M ′, wA), see (1), to an inverse
Monge assignment problem (M,M ′, A) is called a inverse-Monge assignment
game. Moreover, if m = m′, we have a square inverse-Monge assignment
game.
For square inverse Monge assignment problems (see Burkard et al., 1996)
an optimal matching, which may not be unique, is placed on the main di-
agonal. Then the worth of the grand coalition for the associated coalitional
game is given by
wA
(
M ∪M ′) = m∑
k=1
akk.
We analyze the core of an inverse-Monge assignment game and in the
next section we characterize the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core
allocations. To obtain these we have to compute the marginal contribution
of a player, see (4), and therefore it is crucial to know how to compute an
optimal matching for a non-square inverse Monge assignment problem.
The next proposition provides some indications as to where to look for
an optimal matching. Its proof can be found in Aggarwal et al. (1992).
Proposition 3.1. For any inverse Monge assignment problem (M,M ′, A),
with |M | ≤ |M ′|, at least one optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′) is mono-
tone, i.e.
for all i1, i2 ∈M, with i1 < i2, then µ(i1) < µ(i2).
Monotone matchings can be seen as generalized main diagonal match-
ings, since they coincide with the matchings given by the main diagonal en-
tries of the square submatrices of maximal order. When the inverse Monge
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assignment problem is square, there is only one monotone matching, placed
on the main diagonal. So, henceforth, to distinguish the agents on the two
sides of the problem we will denote by k′ ∈M ′ the partner of player k ∈M
by this optimal matching.
Now we are in position to give a description of the core of a square Monge
assignment game.
Theorem 3.1. Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be a square inverse-Monge assignment
game. Then (u, v) ∈ RM+ × RM
′
+ belongs to the core of the game, C(wA), if
and only if
ui + vi = aii for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (8)
ui + vi+1 ≥ ai i+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, (9)
ui+1 + vi ≥ ai+1 i for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1. (10)
Proof. The ‘only if’ part is obvious from the definition of the core of an
assignment game, see (2) and (3), and the fact that one optimal matching
is placed on the main diagonal.
Now to prove the ‘if’ part, consider for i+ 1 < j, the square subproblem
formed by {i, i+ 1, . . . , j − 1}× {(i+ 1)′, . . . , j′} . One optimal matching in
the square inverse Monge subproblem is placed on the main diagonal of the
submatrix, that is, µ = {(i, i+ 1), (i+ 1, i+ 2), . . . , (j − 1, j)} , and then:
j−1∑
k=i
ak k+1 ≥ aij +
j−1∑
k=i+1
akk.
Now, considering (8) and (9), we obtain
ui + vj =
j−1∑
k=i
uk +
j∑
k=i+1
vk −
j−1∑
k=i+1
akk ≥
j−1∑
k=i
ak k+1 −
j−1∑
k=i+1
akk ≥ aij .
If j + 1 < i, just take the subproblem {j + 1, . . . , i}× {j′, . . . , (i− 1)′} , and
repeat a similar argument.
The above result reduces the number of inequalities needed to obtain the
core of a square inverse-Monge assignment game, see (2) and (3). In fact,
the core of a square inverse-Monge assignment game is the same as that of
the assignment game in which we preserve the main diagonal and the upper
and lower diagonals, and reduce to zero all the remaining entries.
In the following proposition we show an important consequence of the
above theorem; two square inverse-Monge assignment games have the same
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core if and only if their matrices have the same principal band, that is, the
elements of the main diagonal and the upper and lower diagonals.
Proposition 3.2. Let (M ∪ M ′, wA) and (M ∪ M ′, wB) be two square
inverse-Monge assignment games. The following statements are equivalent:
1. C(wA) = C(wB),
2. aij = bij for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ such that |i− j| ≤ 1.
Proof. 1. =⇒ 2. Since both square matrices satisfy the inverse Monge
property, each has one optimal matching on its main diagonal. Therefore,
from the non-emptiness of the core and using (8), aii = bii for all i =
1, . . . ,m. Moreover from (5), and taking into account that the main diagonal
is an optimal matching, for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
min
(u,v)∈C(wA)
{ui + vi+1} = aii+ai+1 i+1−wA(M∪M ′)+wA(M∪M ′\{i′, i+1}).
We compute wA(M ∪ M ′ \ {i′, i + 1}), for i = 1, 2, ...,m − 1. Since the
subproblem (M \{i+1})×(M ′ \{i′}) is square, its main diagonal is optimal
and then:
wA(M ∪M ′ \ {i′, i+ 1}) =
i−1∑
k=1
akk + ai i+1 +
m∑
k=i+2
akk.
Therefore, we obtain min(u,v)∈C(wA) {ui + vi+1} = ai i+1.
This equality implies the existence of an allocation (u, v) ∈ C(wA) such
that ui + vi+1 = ai i+1. By the hypothesis of the equality of the cores we
obtain that ai i+1 ≥ bi i+1. A symmetric argument leads to ai i+1 = bi i+1 for
i = 1, 2, ...,m−1. The equality between ai+1 i and bi+1 i is proved analogously.
2. =⇒ 1. It is straightforward from Theorem 3.1.
4. Buyers-optimal and sellers-optimal core allocations
In this section we use the previous results to simplify the calculation of
the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations for an arbitrary
square inverse-Monge assignment game.
First we compute what is called the buyer-seller exact representative ma-
trix of the original problem (M,M ′, A). The buyer-seller exact representative
matrix Ar was introduced in Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002b) as the only matrix
to have two important properties: (1) it has the same core as the original
game, i.e. C(wA) = C(wAr), and (2) all its entries are attainable from a
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core element, i.e. for each (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ there exists (u, v) ∈ C(wAr) such
that ui + vj = a
r
ij .
Moreover, entries in this matrix can be defined by using the core as:
arij = min
(u,v)∈C(wA)
{ui + vj} ,
or by using the characteristic function when matrix A is square, see (5), as:
arij = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j − wA(M ∪M ′) + wA(M ∪M ′ \ {µ(i), µ−1(j)}),
for any optimal matching µ ∈M∗A(M,M ′).
Now we define an auxiliary matrix for any square assignment matrix. We
prove later that this matrix is the buyer-seller exact representative matrix,
when the original matrix satisfies the inverse Monge property.
Let A ∈ M+m×m. Define A˜ = (a˜ij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ in the following way:
a˜ij =

∑j−1
k=i ak k+1 −
∑j−1
k=i+1 akk for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
aii for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m,∑i−1
k=j ak+1 k −
∑i−1
k=j+1 akk for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m,
(11)
where the summation over an empty set of indices is zero. Notice that entries
in the principal band do not change, that is, a˜ij = aij for |i − j| ≤ 1. It is
easy to see that a˜i j + a˜i+1 j+1 = a˜i j+1 + a˜i+1 j for |i− j| ≥ 1.
Let (M,M ′, A) be a square inverse Monge assignment problem, and let
A˜ be defined as in (11). Then, a˜ij ≥ aij for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′. To see this,
consider for i < j the square subproblem formed by {i, i+ 1, . . . , j − 1} ×
{(i+ 1)′, . . . , j′} . One optimal matching is placed on its main diagonal and
then
∑j−1
k=i ak k+1 ≥ aij +
∑j−1
k=i+1 akk. The inequality follows. The case j < i
is similar. It is easy to see that this matrix A˜ satisfies the inverse Monge
property, from its definition.
Proposition 4.1. For any square inverse-Monge assignment game (M ∪
M ′, wA), matrix A˜ defined by (11) is the buyer-seller exact representative of
matrix A, Ar = A˜, that is,
1. C(wA) = C(wA˜),
2. For each pair (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′ there exists (u, v) ∈ C(wA) such that
ui + vj = a˜ij .
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Proof. Since A˜ has the same principal band as the original matrix A, we
obtain that both associated games give rise to the same core (see Proposition
3.2). Then C(wA) = C(wA˜). Let us check that any entry of the matrix A˜ is
attainable by a point of the core of the game.
To this end, we introduce a matrix A, which is no more than the matrix
generated only by the main diagonal and the upper diagonal by equality in
(7) for the consecutive 2× 2 submatrices. Formally,
aij =

∑j−1
k=i ak k+1 −
∑j−1
k=i+1 akk for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
aii for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m,∑i
k=j akk −
∑i−1
k=j ak k+1 for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m.
It is a simple calculation to show that matrix A satisfies aij +akl = ail +akj
for all 1 ≤ i < k ≤ m, and 1 ≤ j < l ≤ m. A crucial consequence is that any
matching is optimal in A.
Moreover, notice that4 A ≥ A, because (a) the main diagonal entries
have been preserved, (b) for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, we have aij = arij ≥ aij , and
(c) for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m, we have aij =
∑i
k=j akk −
∑i−1
k=j ak k+1 ≥ aij since
the square subproblem {j, j + 1, . . . , i} × {j′, j′ + 1, . . . , i′} has an optimal
matching on the main diagonal of the restriction of A.
Summarizing, matrices A and A have the same main diagonal which is
optimal, and from the above comments, we have C(wA) ⊆ C(wA). Moreover,
each of the entries in A is in some optimal matching (all matchings in A
are optimal). This implies that for any (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′ with i ≤ j there
exists (u, v) ∈ C(wA) such that ui + vj = aij = arij . This finishes the proof
of statement 2 for the elements of the upper triangle.
The proof for the lower triangle is similar, but using matrix A, whose
entries are defined as:
aij =

∑j
k=i akk −
∑j−1
k=i ak+1 k for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
aii for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m,∑i−1
k=j ak+1 k −
∑i−1
k=j+1 akk for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m.
Matrix A is generated by the main diagonal and the lower diagonal of matrix
A. Thus, combining statements 1 and 2 we have obtained that matrix A˜ is
the buyer-seller exact representative of matrix A.
There is a practical, recursive way to compute matrix A˜, given in (11).
The idea is to compute the diagonals parallel to the principal band, starting
4Let A,B ∈ M+m×m′ , then A ≥ B if aij ≥ bij for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′.
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with the closest. To obtain entries ari i+2 for i = 1, . . . ,m − 2, we compute
them by using formula (11):
a˜i i+2 = ai i+1 + ai+1 i+2 − ai+1 i+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 2.
Now we continue with the elements of the next parallel diagonal:
a˜i i+3 = a˜i i+2 + a˜i+1 i+3 − a˜i+1 i+2 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 3.
The process is repeated until we complete the entries in the upper triangle.
Similarly, we can compute the entries in the lower triangle by the recursive
method,
a˜i+2 i = ai+1 i + ai+2 i+1 − ai+1 i+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 2, and
a˜i+k i = a˜i+k−1 i + a˜i+k i+1 − a˜i+k−1 i+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− k,
and all k = 3, . . . ,m− 1.
In the following theorem we provide an explicit formula to compute
the agents’ maximum and minimum core payoffs. In this way we compute
the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocation, whenever dealing
with square inverse-Monge assignment games. The formula uses the entries
of the above buyer-seller exact representative.
Theorem 4.1. Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be a square inverse-Monge assignment
game, and matrix Ar its buyer-seller exact representative, given by (11).
The buyers-optimal core allocation (uA, vA) and the sellers-optimal core al-
location (uA, vA) are given by:
uAi = aii − vAi , vAi = maxt=1,...,m {a
r
ti − att} ,
uAi = maxt=1,...,m
{arit − att} , vAi = aii − uAi ,
for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. Since matrix A is square and satisfies the inverse Monge property, we
know that wA (M ∪M ′) =
∑m
k=1 akk. To obtain u
A
i using (4), for all i ∈M,
we need to compute the worth of wA(M ∪M ′ \ {i}) . A similar reasoning is
applied to compute vAj for any player j ∈M ′.
Let i ∈ M and denote by A−i the matrix that results from A when we
remove row i. We know that matrix A−i satisfies the inverse Monge property.
By Proposition 3.1 at least one optimal matching of the subproblem (M \
{i},M ′, A−i) has to be monotone, and since matrix A−i has m−1 rows and
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m columns, the monotone matchings can be described by µ1, . . . , µm, where,
for 1 ≤ t < i,
µt = {(1, 1), . . . , (t− 1, t− 1), (t, t+ 1), . . . , (i− 1, i), (i+ 1, i+ 1), . . . , (m,m)} ,
µi = {(1, 1), . . . , (i− 1, i− 1), (i+ 1, i+ 1), . . . , (m,m)} , and for i < t ≤ m,
µt = {(1, 1), . . . , (i− 1, i− 1), (i+ 1, i), . . . , (t, t− 1), (t+ 1, t+ 1), . . . , (m,m)} .
Therefore, for any i ∈M,
uAi = wA(M ∪M ′)− wA(M ∪M ′ \ {i})
=
m∑
k=1
akk − max
t=1,...,m
 ∑
k∈M\{i}
akµt(k)

= aii − max
t=1,...,m
 ∑
k∈M\{i}
(
akµt(k) − akk
) . (12)
Recall expression (11) of the buyer-seller exact matrix and notice now that
in expression (12),
∑
k∈M\{i}
(
akµt(k) − akk
)
becomes
i−1∑
k=t
(ak k+1 − akk) = arti − att, for 1 ≤ t < i,
0 = artt − att, for t = i,
t∑
k=i+1
(ak k−1 − akk) = arti − att, for i < t ≤ m.
The result follows. For the rest of the proof just notice that uAi + v
A
i = aii
and uAi + v
A
i = aii for i = 1, . . . ,m.
As a consequence we can compute the fair-division point (Thompson,
1981) the midpoint between the optimal allocation for the buyers and the
optimal allocation for the sellers. Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002a) prove that this
point coincides with the τ -value of the assignment game.
5. Non-square inverse-Monge assignment games
In this section we analyze the core, the buyers-optimal and the sellers-
optimal core allocations of a non-square inverse-Monge assignment game
(M ∪M ′, wA), where |M | < |M ′|.
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Fix a monotone optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A(M,M ′). The non-optimally
assigned sellers receive a zero payoff in any core allocation, but they in-
troduce significant bounds for the buyers’ payoffs, since any core allocation
(u, v) ∈ C(wA) must satisfy ui + vj ≥ aij , for all (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′. This
implies ui ≥ maxj /∈µ(M){aij} = aµi , for all i ∈M.
Therefore we associate any non-square inverse-Monge assignment game
(M∪M ′, wA) where |M | < |M ′|, with am×(m+1) assignment game in which
buyers and sellers that are assigned under the monotone optimal matching
µ have been placed together in the first positions, and the last m+1 column
is (aµi )i∈M defined above, in which we have condensed all unmatched sellers’
columns. Notice that we are not assuming that this “condensed” matrix
satisfies the inverse Monge property, but the square submatrix of assigned
players does.
By using this procedure, we can find the buyers-optimal core allocation
and the sellers-optimal core allocation of an arbitrary non-square inverse-
Monge assignment game. The following theorem provides the formulas to
compute them, similar to the formulas derived in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 5.1. Let A ∈ M+m×m be a square matrix satisfying the inverse
Monge property, and Ar its buyer-seller exact representative, given by (11).
Let
B =
 a1m+1A ...
amm+1
 ∈ M+m×(m+1), with wB (M ∪M ′) = m∑
k=1
akk,
where M = {1, . . . ,m} and M ′ = {1′, . . . , (m+ 1)′} .
Then,the buyers-optimal core allocation (uB, vB) and the sellers-optimal
core allocation (uB, vB) are given by:
uBi = u
A
i = aii − vAi , vBi = vAi = maxt=1,...,m {a
r
ti − att} ,
uBi = maxt=1,...,m
{arit − att + atm+1} , vBi = aii − uBi ,
for i = 1, . . . ,m, and vBm+1 = v
B
m+1 = 0.
Proof. Let us prove first that uBi = u
A
i for i = 1, . . . ,m. Consider matrix
B0 ∈ M+m×(m+1), in which the m+ 1 column of B has been filled with zeros.
It is obvious that uAi = u
B0
i for i = 1, . . . ,m, and, since some entries have
been lowered to zero, uB0i ≥ uBi for i = 1, . . . ,m. Then uB0i ≥ uBi ≥ aim+1 for
i = 1, . . . ,m. Notice that (uB0 , vB0) ∈ C(wB) and then the buyers-optimal
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core allocation for wB0 coincides with the buyers-optimal core allocation for
wB, which proves u
B
i = u
A
i for i = 1, . . . ,m. Since u
A
i + v
A
i = u
B
i + v
B
i = aii
for i = 1, . . . ,m, we have vAi = v
B
i for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Now, to compute vBi for i = 1, . . . ,m, we use expression (4) and thus we
need to obtain the worth of wB(M∪M ′\{i′}). This worth is computed as the
maximum of all matchings obtained by taking entry atm+1 for t = 1, . . . ,m
and a matching in the subproblem M \ {t} ×M ′ \ {i′, (m+ 1)′} :
wB(M∪M ′\{i′}) = max
t=1,...,m
{
atm+1 + wB((M \ {t}) ∪M ′ \ {i′, (m+ 1)′})
}
.
This subproblem M \ {t} ×M ′ \ {i′, (m+ 1)′} is square and since matrix A
satisfies the inverse Monge property, we know that the optimal matching is
in its main diagonal. Therefore, and using expression (11), wB((M \ {t}) ∪
M ′ \ {i′, (m+ 1)′}) equals:
a) if t < i,
t−1∑
k=1
akk +
i−1∑
k=t
ak+1 k +
m∑
k=i+1
akk =
m∑
k=1
akk − att − aii +
i−1∑
k=t
ak+1 k −
i−1∑
k=t+1
akk =
m∑
k=1
akk − att − aii + arit,
b) if t = i,
t−1∑
k=1
akk +
m∑
k=t+1
akk =
m∑
k=1
akk − aii,
c) if t > i,
i−1∑
k=1
akk +
t−1∑
k=i
ak k+1 +
m∑
k=t+1
akk =
m∑
k=1
akk − aii − att +
t−1∑
k=i
ak k+1 −
t−1∑
k=i+1
akk =
m∑
k=1
akk − aii − att + arit.
Thus we obtain:
wB(M ∪M ′ \ {i′}) =
m∑
k=1
akk − aii + max
t=1,...,m
{arit − att + atm+1} , and
vBi = wB
(
M ∪M ′)− wB(M ∪M ′ \ {i′}) = aii − max
t=1,...,m
{arit − att + atm+1}.
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Finally, uBi = aii − vBi = maxt=1,...,m{arit − att + atm+1}, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
and since (m+ 1)′ is unmatched, vBm+1 = vBm+1 = 0.
The following example illustrates the previous results.
Example 5.1. Let C be the following 4× 7 assignment matrix, which sat-
isfies the inverse Monge property:
C =

12 11 2 8 33 0 9
6 8 3 10 40 9 30
11 13 13 21 52 22 44
1 4 5 13 45 26 60
 .
We want to compute the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core alloca-
tions, (uC , vC) and (uC , vC).
A monotone optimal matching µ is marked in bold. In order to apply
Theorem 5.1 we rearrange optimally matched players to the first positions
and condense entries for all non-optimally assigned sellers in the last col-
umn. Therefore:
B =
 a
µ
1
A
...
aµ4
 =

12 8 33 9 11
6 10 40 30 9
11 21 52 44 22
1 13 45 60 26
 .
Notice that B does not satisfy the inverse Monge property, but submatrix A
with assigned players does.
First we compute Ar, the buyer-seller exact representative of the first
part of matrix B using (11), and we write it inside matrix B̂.
B̂ =

12 8 38 30 11
6 10 40 32 9
17 21 52 44 22
10 14 45 60 26
 .
Now, using Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 5.1, we compute for buyer 1 and
seller 1 their extreme core payoffs:
vC1 = v
B
1 = v
A
1 = max
t=1,...,4
{art1 − att} = max{0, 6− 10, 17− 52, 10− 60} = 0,
uC1 = u
B
1 = a11 − vC1 = 12− 0 = 12,
uC1 = u
B
1 = max
t=1,...,4
(ar1t − att + at5)
= max{12− 12 + 11, 8− 10 + 9, 38− 52 + 22, 30− 60 + 26} = 11,
vC1 = v
B
1 = a11 − uC1 = 12− 11 = 1, where at5 denotes aµt , t = 1, . . . , 4.
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Proceeding in the same way with the remaining agents, we obtain the buyers-
optimal and sellers-optimal core allocations:
(uC , vC) = (12, 10, 22, 38; 0, 0, 0, 0, 30, 0, 22),
(uC , vC) = (11, 10, 22, 26; 1, 0, 0, 0, 30, 0, 34).
Note that we do not need that the original matrix of a non-square as-
signment problem satisfies the inverse Monge property. It is enough that
the restriction to the square subproblem with assigned players does.
6. Concluding remarks
We have studied assignment games in which the valuation matrix satisfies
the inverse Monge property. This class is a large set and forms a full-
dimensional convex cone in the space of assignment matrices (see Burkard
et al., 1996). We characterize here the buyers-optimal and sellers-optimal
core allocations.
Interestingly, our results can be applied to a more general class of ma-
trices too. Indeed, notice that a permutation of rows and/or columns may
give rise to an inverse Monge matrix. They are called permuted Monge ma-
trices (Burkard et al., 1996). For instance, consider a matrix that satisfies
the standard Monge property, i.e., one where the inequalities sign in (6) is
reversed. By reordering the columns (or rows) from the last to the first, this
matrix can be transformed into an inverse Monge matrix. So our results can
be adapted to the original Monge matrix.
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